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Nous avons étudié dans un article précédent les conditions d’émergence des communautés 
de pratique. Pour ce faire, nous avons développé un modèle d’agents faisant face à un flux 
continu de problèmes à résoudre. Nous centrons maintenant l’analyse sur la performance 
de cette forme organisationnelle en comparaison avec une forme plus hiérarchique qui 
contient un manager et un ensemble d’agents. Le manager reçoit les problèmes et en 
délègue le traitement aux agents qu’il choisit. Nos principaux résultats montrent que les 
structures de communautés sont effectives dans la construction des compétences et qu’il 
existe une complémentarité entre la hiérarchie et la communauté comme l’avait argumenté 
Bowles et Gintis [2000]. 
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Abstract 
In a preceding article we have studied the Communities of Practice and their 
conditions of emergence using an Agent based model of a set of agents facing a 
continuous flow of problems. We center now our analysis on the performance of 
this organizational structure in comparison with a two-level hierarchical delegation 
structure. Our results show the crucial role played by the communication and the 
specialisation of the agents. Our main result shows that community structures are 
efficient for competence building, and particularly, if one considers learning in the 
long term. This paper backs the claim made by Bowles and Gintis [2000] that 
hierarchy and communities are complementary rather than substitute modes of 
governance. 
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June 20, 2003Abstract
In a preceding article we have studied the Communities of Practice and their conditions of emergence using an
Agent based model of a set of agents facing a continuous ﬂow of problems. We center now our analysis on the
performance of this organizational structure in comparison with a two-level hierarchical delegation structure.
Our results show the crucial role played by the communication and the specialisation of the agents. Our main
result shows that community structures are efﬁcient for competence building, and particularly, if one considers
learning in the long term. This paper backs the claim made by Bowles and Gintis [2000] that hierarchy and
communities are complementary rather than substitute modes of governance.
Keywords: Communitiesofpractice, learning, emergenceofnetworks, organisationalefﬁciency, hierarchy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D2, D83, L21 Introduction
The idea that informal social structures play an important role in the behavior and capabilities of organizations
is a long-standing idea in disciplines such as the sociology of organizations [Crozier and Friedberg, 1977] or
management studies [Brown and Duguid, 1991; 1998]. The studies of such informal structures have gained
a growing interest with the recent stress put on the knowledge-based economy and the collective learning
processes that become the key factor for success of ﬁrms in such a framework. Indeed, an important part of
the learning processes within organizations are increasingly seen as taking place within the informal networks
nested in them.
In particular, the concept of community of practice is deemed particularly useful by a number of scholars
to account for the learning processes taking place within an organisation [Brown and Duguid, 1991; 1998;
Wenger, 1998]. The concept of community of practice was introduced by Lave and Wenger [1990] who, by
focusing on individuals’ practices, identiﬁed groups of persons engaged in the same practice, communicating
regularly with one another about their activities. Members of a community of practice essentially seek to
develop their competences in the considered practice. Communities of practice can then be seen as a means
to enhance individual competences, they are oriented toward their members [Lave and Wenger, 1990; Brown
and Duguid, 1991]. This goal is reached through the construction, the exchange and the sharing of a com-
mon repertoire of resources [Wenger, 1998]. According to this deﬁnition, communities of practice appear as
important loci for competence building within ﬁrms. As Wenger [1998] puts it, communities of practice are
elementary regimes of competence. ”These communities might be found in traditional work divisions and de-
partments, but they also cut across functional divisions, spill over into after-work or project-based teams, and
straddle networks of cross-corporate and professional ties. For example, within ﬁrms, classical communities
include functional groups of employees who share a particular specialisation corresponding to the classical
division of labor (e.g. marketing or accounting). They also include teams of employees with heterogeneous
skills and qualiﬁcations, often coordinated by team leaders and put together to achieve a particular goal in a
given period of time” [Amin, Cohendet, 2003].
However, although some works, either empirical or theoretical, investigate the impact of communities
of practice [Orr, 1990; Hubermann and Hogg ,1995] upon the performance of the organisation as a whole,
such studies remain rare. More precisely, some measures of performance of communities themselves would
be desirable. Moreover, the interplay between communities and hierarchy and the output of this interplay
deserves deeper analysis. These issues are difﬁcult to tackle in traditional ways since the impact of communi-
ties upon hierarchical structures and their potential beneﬁts in terms of performance remain largely invisible
in case studies. Their existence can be evidenced but the true input of their activities for the ﬁrm are hard
to assess. Besides, most of the theoretical work on communities of practice leaves some questions (such as
the boundary of communities, for instance) unanswered. The concept is thus difﬁcult to formalize using for
example a mathematical apparatus. In a previous work [Dupou¨ et et al., 2003], we explored the emergence of
communities of practice from a collection of individuals engaged in problem-solving activities. We evidenced
sufﬁcient conditions for the emergence of such social structures and show the usefulness of some indicators
to characterize networks of communities of practice. This paper takes one step further and seeks to shed some
light on the role of communities in the performance of organizations, using computational methods.
By resorting to computer simulations based on the multi-agent system paradigm, this contribution ex-
plores the performances of various organizational settings and, in particular, the role of communities in the
performance of a ﬁrm. Mainly, two types of structures are contrasted: a pure network of communities of prac-
tice and a hierarchical structure. Further, within the later, one can either authorize the potential emergence
of communities by allowing the communication between agents, or remain in a strictly top-down decision
process. It is then possible to compare the outcomes of each of these organizational settings.
This work is organized as follow. First the different components of the model - the role and capabilities
of individual agents and the overall structures - are presented. Next, the results in terms of comparative
performances of organizational structures and the speciﬁc impact of learning and communities are considered.
The last part of the article uses regression trees to analyse the role of the parameters of the model using the
Monte Carlo method.
12 The model
The model we present here is divided in two parts. The ﬁrst one -that we call communities of practice (CP
thereafter) is a collection of agents having to solve a ﬂow of problems and endowed with the abilities to learn
by themselves or by interacting with one another. Each problem is randomly chosen from the problem space
and is sent to an agent chosen randomly. If the problem belongs to the ”core competences” that the agent has
built over time through learning processes, it gives an answer. Otherwise, it consults its community that it has
constructed over the past interactions. If the agent does not receive any response from the contacted agents, it
passes the problem to the next agent in a random list. If the last agent in the list cannot provide any answer,
the problem remain unsolved (the system does not have the competences to deal with this speciﬁc problem).
Such a situation corresponds to a loss for the ﬁrm and hence a decrease in performance. The overall dynamics
thus result both from individual learning by doing and learning by interacting between agents.
The second part of the model consists of an hierarchical structure where a manager is added on top of
the community of the agents. The role of the manager is to receive the problems from the environment and
to select the agent it deems the most able to solve this problem. Its role is thus to carry out a division of
labor. We called this part of the model hierarchy with delegation (HD, thereafter), since the manager has to
ask its subordinates for advice in order to answer the problems submitted by the environment. In addition, we
consider two possibilities: either agents are able to communicate horizontally between them or not.
The article questions the various dimensions of these different organizational settings, with a particular
interest in the role of communities in the global performance of a ﬁrm. In the remaining of this section, we
present the problem space that organizations are facing, the learning processes of agents, the implemented
communication processes and the role of the manager.
2.1 The Environment: Evaluating Financial Projects
The simulation is based on a speciﬁc empirical context: a population of agents whose task consists in allocat-
ing ﬁnancial warranties for bank loans to small enterprises. For each enterprise, a given agent has to determine
a certain amount of warranty by considering a set of criteria. In their endeavor to determine the optimum level
of warranty, agents can communicate between them. They can thus exchange the “best practices” concerning









Figure 1: The problem space
Formally, we suppose that a project is characterized by two criteria stocked as a eight bits long binary
string. The ﬁrst four bits code the value of the ﬁrst criterion and the four last bits the value of the second one.
The problem space is thus a grid and each binary string represents a particular situation and occupies a position
on that grid. An action is associated to each situation (for the agent, the various possibilities take the form
condition : action, where the condition is the binary string and the action is an integer). According to each
particular situation, the agent must propose an amount of warranty (the action): 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% or
250% (respectively coded as actions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 – see Figure 1).The task of the agents is then to determine
the amount of warranty associated to each situation. The gap between the correct amount of warranty and
the answer proposed by the agent determines the reward of the agent. The reward is computed as follow:
f(a) =C·exp(|a∗−a|) whereC is a constant, a∗ is the correct answer expected by the environment and a the
answer proposed by the agent. If the agent proposes an amount of warranty lower than the optimum, it does
not obtain the full amount of commissions that it could have expected from the situation. If, on the contrary,
it proposes a value greater than the optimal one, then in case of bankruptcy of the warranted ﬁrm, the loss
would be greater than for the correct answer. The reward hence takes into account these two types of costs.
The agent uses the reward it receives from the environment to actualize and reﬁne its behavior.
2.2 Modeling of individual learning
Each agent has to classify the various situations (projects represented as binary strings) in one of the six areas
deﬁned by these six possible actions (see Figure 1). Its experience (the results it obtained from past trials) must
help it in reﬁning the judgement of the agent. This process corresponds to the individual learning process.
This is a typical classiﬁcation problem and, given the multi-agent system we adopt, a rather natural way to
represent this kind of process is the Learning Classiﬁer System (LCS). Indeed, a LCS is a relevant tool for
simulating relatively realistic learning processes [Lanzi and Riolo, 2000].
More speciﬁcally, the structure we adopt for each individual agent is an XCS [Wilson, 1995], an algo-
rithm from the family of LCS. An XCS carries out a two-step procedure (see Figure 2). It ﬁrst establishes
a cartography of the whole problem space and associated rewards. Once this mapping is complete, it can
choose in its memory the answer leading to the highest reward in each situation. An XCS receives a signal
(problem) from the environment through a detector. This signal is then compared to the set of rules the agent
has in its memory. These rules are made of a condition part and an action part. Moreover, several parameters
are associated with each rule: p, the prediction of performance, e, the error associated to the prediction of
performance, F, the ﬁtness which is a measure of the accuracy of the rules (a function of the inverse of the
error) and that is used in the genetic algorithm used by the XCS to explore the problem space. Rules of which
the condition part ﬁts the signal from the environment are stored in an array called the match set. A prediction
array is then constituted in order to evaluate the reward associated with each advocated action. Based on this
array, an action is chosen and triggered in the environment. In our implementation, the agent can select the
action predicting the highest reward from the environment or use a roulette wheel process to select the action
to be ﬁred. A parameter selectAg controls the choice of the selection mode : When set to 1, the best action
is chosen, when set to 0, the roulette wheel is used. In the latter case, each rule has a positive probability of
being chosen and this probability increases with the performance of the rule. The environment then rewards
the XCS which uses this reward to adjust the parameters of its rules.
Basedontheliteratureoncommunitiesofpractice, weendowtheagentswiththefollowingcharacteristics:
An agent seeks to develop its competences on a given practice. This practice does not constitute its entire
activity but is nonetheless deemed critical by the agent. Moreover, the learning process of each agent is
oriented: new rules produced by the genetic algorithm are inserted in its memory only if they are in its core
competences (specialisation). The surface of the specialisation is controlled by the parameter compRange
that can rank from 0 to 1. When compRange is equal to 1, the agent is not specialised and can accept all the
problems submitted by the environment. When it is close to 0, the agent becomes highly specialised. Using
the fact that the problem space is a grid, compRange is the euclidean distance between the condition part of
the received problem (the signal) and the best rules of the agent. This is intended to account for the focused
learning taking place in communities of practice. An agent has a limited memory that does not permit it to
deal by itself with the whole problem space.
2.3 Learning by Interacting
In our implementation, a parameter, communication, determines whether or not the agents have the ability to
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Figure 2: Schematic XCS (adapted from Wilson [1995])
We now present the communication process.
The agent can have no rule satisfying the signal from the environment or only have a poor rule (with a
prediction of performance below an acceptable threshold – common to all agents). If an agent does not possess
a satisfying rule to answer a problem but the problem lies nonetheless in the realm of its core competences,
it engages a communication process by requesting help from other agents. It receives answers and evaluates
them:
• If a received rule offers a better prediction of performance, then it adopts it.
• If predictions are equivalent (either several rules it received have identical prediction, or the rules it
received and the ones it already possesses have identical prediction), it compares the prediction error
and opts for the rule having the lowest one.
• In case of equivalence between prediction errors, it compares ﬁtnesses and chooses the rule with the
highest ﬁtness. When all these parameters are not discriminating, the agent choses a rule at random.
By choosing a rule, the agent copies it in its memory and uses it to answer the signal from the environment.
Each agent uses an address book to keep in memory successive communications with different partners.
This address book is originally empty. When an agent ﬁrst launches a communication process, it asks a
percentage (consultRatio) of the whole population at random. It then stores in its address book the references
of agents answering him (not only the ones giving him the best answers). In the following periods, the agent
will question the agents present in its address book. If none of these agents answers its enquiry, it will then
ask once again consultRatio of the total population of agents, which can be seen as an exploration of its
social environment and a search for new partners. In order to avoid the presence of non relevant agents in
the address book, a counter (exval) is associated with each agent present in a given address book. If an agent
does not answer to exval consecutive enquiries, it is removed from the address book. exval is thus a parameter
indicative of the stability of links established by agents.
Hence,
• in order to enhance its practice, an agent engages with other agents in the building and the sharing of a
common repertoire of knowledge resources. In particular, this implies that the agent is always willing
4to cooperate with other potential members of a community and that there is no direct costs associated
with the establishment of a new relation;
• the agent then nurtures this community of practice with its experience and in turn relies on this commu-
nity to enhance its practice.
Behaviors of agents are then twofold: they are engaged in a practice involving individual learning and
they are committed to social interactions. However, these two parts are inter-related in that communication



















Figure 3: Problem solving procedure of the manager
2.4 The Role of the Manager
The second organizational structure implemented consists in the simple addition of a manager on top of the
structure presented so far. The environment remains the same. However, in this new organisation, the signals
from the environment are directly received by the manager. The duty of the manager is to allocate the task
of answering a given signal to the most suited agent for this speciﬁc problem. The role of the manager can
then be seen as twofold. On the one hand, it has to allocate efﬁciently the tasks as they are submitted by the
environment. On the other hand, since the allocation of tasks made by the manager will inﬂuence the learning
processes of the agents, it can also be viewed as a guide for the learning of agents.
From the modelling standpoint, the manager is an XCS similar to the ones used for modeling agents. The
condition part of the manager’s rules corresponds to the signals arising from the environment. The action parts
consist of the references to the agents (i.e. each agent is referenced to by an integer).
To chose an agent for answering a given problem, the manager proceeds as follow (see Figure 3). First, the
manager tries to ﬁnd an agent by selecting in its memory a rule that matches the signal from the environment.
If it does not have any rule, then the manager chooses an agent that is not often called and that has a core
competence close to the signal submitted by the environment. In the latter case, the manager adds in its
memory a new rule of which the condition part is the signal from the environment and whose action part
is the reference to the selected agent. As in the case of agents, the manager can select the rule with the
best prediction of performance or use a roulette wheel process to chose the action. This is controlled by
the parameter selectMan (when selectMan is 1, the rule with the best prediction is chosen, when it is 0, the
roulette wheel is used). Once an agent has been selected by the manager, the problem is passed to this agent
and it tries to answer it.
5Toanswertheproblem, theagentcaneithersolveitaloneoraskforhelpfromotheragents(ifcommunication
is set to 1). However, the problem is not passed to another agent when the selected agent cannot answer. In
that case, the problem remains unsolved and this incurs a loss (opportunity cost) for the organisation.
The selected agent returns its answer directly to the environment that evaluates it and gives a reward. The
reward is then used by the agent and the manager to carry on their learning processes and reﬁne the parameters
associated with their rules.
3 Simulation protocol and main results
3.1 The simulation protocol and methodology
Given the complexity of the interactions we model and the strong non-linearity of the decision processes of
the agents, we adopt a methodology that allows quite a systematic exploration of the parameter space of the
model. This methodology is close to Monte-Carlo method. For each of our two models, we run 500 series of
15 000 problems each where the results from each problem has a probability of 1% of being saved. So, for
each run we obtain an average number of 150 randomly chosen observations for all the measured variables.
All series are initialised with a randomly drawn vector of values for the main parameters of the model. As
a result, we obtain, for each model, a set of 75 000 observations covering quite a diversiﬁed subset of the
parameter space and the problem space. The values from which different parameters are drawn can be read in
the appendix. We analyse these random samples using box plots (giving the four quartiles of the distributions
of the variables), Student tests between subsets, histograms and regression trees. The statistical analysis is
conducted using R (see Ithaka and Gentleman [1996]).
We use some speciﬁc indicators in order to qualify the organizational performance. The ﬁrst and the
most direct indicator is the gross performance that belongs to [−1000,1000]. When the organisation faces a
problem, it can ﬁnd a solution and obtain the actual performance returned by the environment, or it can be
unable to provide a solution, in which case the problem remains unsolved, and the performance is equal to
an opportunity cost: the negative of the past average performance (the opportunity that the organisation has
missed by being unable to solve the problem). This indicator is quite crude but it nevertheless measures the
pay-off that the organisation gets through problem solving.
However, the gross performance neglects another important dimension of the efﬁciency of the organiza-
tions: the cost of communication. If a solution is found after a tremendous amount of communication between
agents, it would correspond to a relatively high organizational cost. In order to take into account the cost as





3.2 Main results of the simulations
We focus the analysis of the results on issues concerning the performance of organizations in problem solving.
We ﬁrst proceed by comparing these organizational forms from the point of view of gross performance. These
ﬁrst results are reﬁned afterwards through the analysis of the role of communications and communities of
practice. The last step of the analysis clariﬁes the role of different parameters in these results using regression
trees.
3.2.1 Comparative analysis of the organizational performance
As it will clearly appear in the rest of this analysis, the possibility of communication plays a crucial role
in the performance of the organisations. The Figure 4 compares the distribution of the performances of
hierarchy (HD) and communities of practice (CP) between two cases: with communications (1) and without
communications (0). The graphic (a) shows that the hierarchy needs communications for attaining better






































(b)− Performance in CP
Figure 4: Comparison of gross performance between organizations: with (1) and without (0) communication
(due to unsolved problems). As a consequence, communications do not play the same role in these two
organizational structures. The role of communication will be analysed more in detail in the next section.
The comparison of results between HD and CP shows that CP is able to attain, on average, better payoffs
than HD. The organizational structure plays the main role in the determination of the performance, but com-
munities with communication (CP(communication = 1)) attain the highest performances and the complete
ordering between these four cases is given by
CP(1) ≥CP(0) ≥ HD(1) ≥ HD(0) (2)
Student tests between these cases give the following results:
H1 :CP < HD → t = 64.2951, d f = 149390.3, p−value = 1
H1 :CP(1) < HD(1) → t = 51.3433, d f = 122334.1, p−value = 1
H1 :CP(1) <CP(0) → t = 8.9367, d f = 31741.86, p−value = 1
H1 :CP(0) < HD(1) → t = 27.6562, d f = 32190.58, p−value = 1
H1 : HD(1) < HD(0) → t = 41.9592, d f = 12777.20, p−value = 1
H1 :CP(0) < HD(0) → t = 55.6133, d f = 18648.14, p−value = 1


















































Figure 5: Distribution of cliquishness for the cases with the maximal performance
73.2.2 Emergence and performance of the communities of practice
The comparative analysis of performance indicates that communications among agents outside the hierarchi-
cal line play a role in the behavior of the system as a whole. In our setting, to allow communication is to
allow agents to build relational structures outside the mere hierarchy. In other words, when communications
occur, one can hope to observe the emergence of communities of practice. To account for the emergence of
communities of practice, we here use an indicator well-known in social network analysis, the cliquishness
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. Cliquishness captures the idea that two agents connected to another agent are
likely to be connected to one another. It is thus an indicator of the existence or not of groups of tightly con-
nected agents within the graph. Cliquishness can rank from 0 to 1. When it is equal to 0, no triangles exist
within the graph. When cliquishness equals 1, the graph is made of fully connected subgraphs. In a random
graph, the cliquishness is typically equals to 0.02. Values of cliquishness that are greater than that by several
orders of magnitude are indicative of structures having social origins within the graph [Newman et al., 2001].


















































Figure 6: Distribution of cliquishness for the cases with the highest 50% efﬁciencyratios
To study the role of communities in the overall performance, we thus map the distribution of cliquishness
in each quartile of ef ficiencyRatio and performance both for the case of pure communities of practice and
hierarchy. Recall that ef ficiencyRatio is the aggregated parameter that indicates the quality of the answer
given by the system to the environment in terms of performance and delay of response.
We give the quartiles of the distributions of these variables in Table 1.
CP HD
Quartiles performance ef ficiencyRatio performance ef ficiencyRatio
Q1 [−725.26;18[ [−612.27;0.05[ [−749.10;−456.48[ [−739.20;−36.52[
Q2 [18;368[ [0.05;4.23[ [−456.48;18[ [−36.52;6[
Q3 [368;1000[ [4.23;22.73[ [18;1000[ [6;66.66[
Q4 {1000} [22.73;1000] {1000} [66.66;1000]
Table 1: Quartiles of performance indicators
First let’s consider the role of the communities of practice in the gross performance of the organisation.
Figure 5 shows that in CP as well as in HD, the most frequent values of the cliquishness, when the perfor-
mance is maximal, are the ones that also corresponds to the emergence of the communities of practice (the
distributions possess a cumulation around 0.2−0.3. As a consequence, we can conclude that the communities
of practice are the most common network structures that imply the highest gross performance.
But does this conclusion remain valid if we include the cost of communications in the evaluation of
the performance ? The Figure 6 gives the distribution of the cliquishness in the last two quartiles of the
ef ficiencyratio. Even if the result is slightly weaker for CP, the values of the cliquishness close to the
8communities of practice are the most common ones in the observations with the 50% highest ef ficiencyratios
when communication is allowed.
These results show that for both types of organisations, the highest performances are attained mainly in the
cases where the communities of practice emerge. Even if it is practically quite arbitrary to determine a limit
value of the cliquishness corresponding to the emergence of the communities of practice, the correspondence
between the highest performances and the presence of the structures similar to the communities of practice is
quite strong.
3.2.3 Role of the communications
Theconstitutionofcommunities relieson thefactthatcommunications exist. Inordertoreﬁnetheresultsfrom
the previous section, we thus display the boxplots of each structure, considering in each case the situations


























































Figure 8: Boxplot of efﬁciency ratio with and without communications in HD
That the ef ficiencyRatio reaches greater values when no communication takes place is not a surprise.
This simply shows that when agents are able to communicate, they do so. This increase their response time,
thereby decreasing their ef ficiencyRatio. This phenomenon is more important in the case of communities of
practice since the manager does impose a limit in terms of the number of communications allowed (and hence
in terms of the time allocated to give an answer to the environment).
The ef ficiencyRatio of communities of practice remains higher than the one of hierarchy when commu-
nication is allowed in both structures. This is due to the fact that the performance of communities is higher
than the ones of the hierarchy. In particular, given that the problem can be passed to the whole population
9of agents in the case of communities, this system has a high probability to provide an answer and hence it
seldom receives negative rewards. Nonetheless, the boxplots show that the ef ficiencyRatio of the hierarchy
often reaches higher values than the communities alone when communications are allowed in both cases. In
that case, the two structures, the hierarchical one and the informal one, are complementary in reaching the
best efﬁciency level [Bowles and Gintis, 2000].
3.2.4 Behind the curtains: the role of the main parameters
We analyse the role of different parameters of the model using regression trees (Venables and Ripley [1999],
chapter 10). A regression tree establishes a hierarchy between independent variables using their contributions
to the overall ﬁt
¡
R2¢
of the regression. More exactly, it splits the set of observations in sub-classes charac-
terized by their value in terms of their contribution to the overall ﬁt and of their predictions for the dependent
variables (all parameters that are modiﬁed by the Monte Carlo procedure are included as explanatory variables
in each of the following regressions). This value is validated against a fraction (10%) of the sample that is not
used during the estimation. Regression trees are very ﬂexible and powerful in the clariﬁcation of the structure
of the observations. We now consider the determinants of the main performance variables of our model.
Hierarchy of variables in HD with communications
|
selectman< 0.5












Figure 9: Regression tree for the gross performance in HD
Determinants of the gross performance The Figures 9 and 10 exhibit the variables that contribute more
than 1% to the overall ﬁt in both cases (HD and CP) with communications.
HD with communications In the case of the hierarchy, the main determinants of the gross performance are
selectMan, compRange and selectAgent. The other variables play only a marginal role. Higher per-
formance is obtained when selectMan = 1, and hence, when the manager chooses the best agent in its
agents set, for each problem (instead of choosing each agent with a positive probability, even if it is
increasing with the performance, selectMan = 0). When the manager uses this best action rule, the
agents should not be too specialized (compRange ≥ 0.20) in order to have a signiﬁcant global perfor-
mance. This performance is even higher if the agents also use the best action rule (selectAgent = 1)
for choosing their actions. When the manager uses a more explorative strategy (selectMan = 0), the
organisation is only able to treat problems if the agents are not too specialized.













Figure 10: Regression tree for the gross performance in CP
CP with communications In the communities, the hierarchy between the determinants is slightly different.
Even if selectAgent plays the main role in the segregation of different cases, the specialisation of the
agents clearly appears as the main determinant of the performances. The community can only attain sig-
niﬁcant performances if the agents are not too specialised (compRange ≥ 0.13). When conditions upon
compRange and selectAgent are fulﬁlled, then time matters (i.e. period). There is a learning trajectory
of the system over time. Since this does not happen in HD, it seems that the initial conditions in CP
are less determining than in HD. It is interesting to observe that other dimensions of the communication
(like the consultRatio) play only a marginal role in the determination of the gross performance. Their
role only appears when we consider more qualitative aspects of the performance.
Determinants of the EfﬁciencyRatio The efﬁciency ratio gives the relative efﬁciency of the communica-
tions in the organisation (performance/total communications). At an intuitive level, it compares the beneﬁts
with the costs due to communications, especially when they are excessive in a sense that they only happen
because the agents are not able to treat the problem – a case that concerns the efﬁciency of the communities.
The Figures 11 and 12 exhibit the determinants of this relative efﬁciency for both organizational forms.
HD with communications In the case of the hierarchy, the main determinants of the efﬁciency ratio are the
specialisation of the agents (compRange), the percentage of the agent consulted (consultRatio) and the
selectivity of the manager’s decision rules (selectMan). For compRange < 0.17, the hierarchy is not
veryefﬁcientandhasdifﬁcultiestoﬁndsolutionsfortheproblems. So, iftheagentsareveryspecialized,
the efﬁciency ratio is very low. With less specialised agents, the hierarchy can ﬁnd solutions for the
problems but the communications are most efﬁcient when the manager is selective and the agents more
strongly consult other agents.
CP with communications Quite interestingly, the mechanics of the communication efﬁciency are quite dif-
ferent in the case of the communities. Three variables play a signiﬁcative role: the consultRatio, which
gives the lowest efﬁciency when it is really too low, compRange, which conditions the efﬁciency for
higher values of consultRatio. Lastly, as was the case for the gross performance, time intervenes when
the best conditions upon the two other parameters are met. It is interesting to observe that in all these
11Determinants of efficiencyratio in HD with communications
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comprange< 0.1707














Figure 11: Regression tree for the efﬁciency ratio in HD















Figure 12: Regression tree for the efﬁciency ratio in CP
12cases, the communities have good rates of treatment of problems (the expected efﬁciency ratio is posi-
tive in each case).

























Figure 13: Regression tree for the cliquishness in HD

























Figure 14: Regression tree for the cliquishness in CP
Determinants of the cliquishness The role of cliquishness in the characterization of the emergence of
the communities practice has been studied by us in a previous article (see [Dupou¨ et and al., 2003]) and
above. In particular, we have established in this article that the communities of practice should correspond
to a cliquishness around 0.3. Figures 13 and 14 show that the determinants of the social structure are quite
different in these two organizational structures.
HD with communications ThreevariablesinterveneintheemergenceofcommunitiesinthecaseHD:consultRatio,
exval and compRange. When consultRatio is low (consultRatio ≤ 0.11), then no communities can
emerge and the value of cliquishness is almost one of a random graph. When 0.11 ≤ consultRatio <
130.35, then exval has to be quite high, that is there must be some kind of ﬁdelity in relationships between
agents, in order to observe communities. Even when consultRatio is higher, exval still has to be above
3.5 to obtain high values of cliquishness. In any case, compRange has to be above a certain threshold
to have values of cliquishness corresponding to full-ﬂedged communities of practice.
CP with communications The same three parameters are the determinants in the emergence of communities
in the case CP. However, compRange (that is the level of specialisation of agents) plays here a less im-
portant role than in the case HD. As in the previous case, when consultRatio is low, high values of exval
help reaching reasonably high values of cliquishness (i.e. exval =0.14). The highest values of cliquish-
ness are attained for high values of consultRatio and exval. Hence, in order to build communities of
practice, agents needs both a great ability to screen their social environment and a certain stability in
their relationships.
4 Conclusion
This article analyses the potential impact that can have informal social structures, communities of practice,
upon the performance of ﬁrms or subunits of ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst result of this work is to show that community structures are efﬁcient for competence building,
and particularly, if one considers learning in the long term (i.e. without strong time constraints). However,
real ﬁrms are required to answer demands from the market in a timely fashion. In these cases, this work tends
to show that hierarchy altogether with communities of practice is the most efﬁcient structure among those we
explore. This paper thus backs the claim made by Bowles and Gintis [2000] that hierarchy and communities
are complementary rather than substitute modes of governance.
Moreover, the examination of the interrelations between variables reveals that two of them are especially
crucial for the emergence of communities and their performances: the degree of specialisation of agents and
the conditions of communication between them. If the former clearly depends on the individual agent, the
second can be seen as part of the environment in which communities exist (e.g. the efforts made by the
management to ease communication, the existence of an intranet, etc.). In the case of HD, one must add
the behavior of management to the two previous parameters. The way managers apprehend their task has an
inﬂuence both on the conditions of emergence of communities within the ﬁrm and on the global performance
of the organisation. It is the interplay between agents idiosyncratic capacities and manager’s behavior that
ends up in an organisation’s speciﬁc outcome.
However, we are well aware that this can only constitute an exploratory work on these issues. Regarding
communities, the detailed dynamics of their behavior has not been explored. In particular, the legitimate
peripheral participation process that Lave and Wenger [1990] put at the heart of the evolution of communities’
structure has not been explored. Besides, concerning the incentives and motivations for agents to enter in a
community, we have assumed that the agents are always willing to enhance their individual competences by
resorting to communities. This assumption is common in the literature about communities of practice but
would certainly deserve a deeper exploration.
Our model with hierarchy also focuses on some key aspects and leaves many other features unaddressed.
For instance, the fostering of communities of practice is not considered as a strategic issue by the manager,
whereas this is certainly a main concern in management studies today. Moreover, we here only dealt with a
speciﬁc form of hierarchy where the manager is engaged in a learning process. It could also be interesting to
investigate a more rigid hierarchy where the manager strongly prescribes the tasks to agents without seeking
to take into account their learning curves or specialisation.
All these limitations highlight the work that remains to be done in modeling the behavior and the role of
communities within ﬁrms. It is hoped that this work contributes to open the way to these future researches.
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15Appendix: Values of the exogenous parameters and initialisation of the model
Meaning Name Value
Number of experiments nbRuns 500
Number of problems submitted to the system during
one experiment
maxProblems 15000
Probability to save the data for statistical treatment saveProb 0.01
Number of agents in the organization totalNumberOfAgents 50
Number of bits usedto code one variable of the problem Bits 4
Number of variables in the problem NbVar 2
Level of specialization of agents (1=maximally gener-
alists, 0=maximally specialized)
compRange ∈ [0,1]
Percentage of the population that can be asked at ran-
dom during agents’ communications
consultRatio ∈ [0,1]
Number of periods during which an agent is kept in an
addressbook even if it does not provide any answer any-
more
n (exval) ∈ [1,14]
Select the mode of selection of agents by the manager
(0 = roulette wheel, 1 = best action)
selectMan ∈ {0,1}
Select the mode of selection of answers to the environ-
ment by agents (0 = roulette wheel, 1 = best action)
selectAg ∈ {0,1}
Number of dontCare symbols allowed in classiﬁers P dontCare ∈ [0,0.025]
Threshold for the application of GA in the action set of
agents and manager
theta GA ∈ [15,35]
Parameters of the XCS:
Number of classiﬁer in agents’ memory maxPopSize 50 for agents;
3000 for manager
Decrease rate for ﬁtness evaluation alpha 0.1
Learning rate for ﬁtness, error, prediction and action set
size updating
beta 0.2
Fraction of the mean ﬁtness below which a classiﬁer
enters in its probability of deletion
delta 0.1
Exponent in the function of ﬁtness evaluation nu 5
Error threshold below which prediction error of a clas-
siﬁer is set to 1
epsilon 0 10
Experience threshold above which a classiﬁer can be
deleted
theta del 20
Probability of crossover (in GA) pX 0.8
Probability of mutation (in GA) pM 0.03
Decrease in error when a new classiﬁer is generated by
GA
predictionErrorReduction 0.25
Decrease in ﬁtness when a new classiﬁer is generated
by GA
fitnessReduction 0.1
Initial prediction of a classiﬁer predicitonIni 10.0
Initial error of a classiﬁer predictionErrorIni 0.0
Initial ﬁtness of a classiﬁer fitnessIni 0.01
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